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Executive remuneration: the power and dominance of human greed 
Introduction 
The constant making and revision of laws and recommendations on executive remuneration 
tend to suggest that there is a ‘bigger’ cause to the problem than a simple luxurious pay 
package. This ‘bigger’ cause is called human greed. Posner explains human greed as ‘man as 
a result of living in a world of limited resources, is a rational self-maximizer, i.e. he always 
aims to maximise his satisfaction and self-interest which is essentially greed.1 Greed can be 
further explained by referring to the Oxford English Dictionary defining greed as ‘the intense 
and selfish desire for something, especially wealth, power, or food.’ The executives occupy 
one of the most important positions in a company because they act on behalf of the company 
by making crucial decisions on a day-to-day basis. This position of an executive in the company 
presents  potentials for conflict of interest which, if not well properly managed, it could be a 
vehicle for greed to ride on. Executive remuneration is part of the corporation’s culture where 
the management (board of directors) decides how much to pay the executives in accordance 
with the company’s articles of association and policies. This position presents  the executives 
with potential to desire/acquire more wealth and power for themselves than for the company 
interest, which generally could be as a result of human greed. To much executive remuneration 
has been in the spotlight since the early 1990s because of its lack of link between executive 
directors pay and company performance; and the widening pay gap between the executives and 
ranked profile employees. This paper argues that without the presence of human greed, 
executives would make reasonable pay deals without the involvement of the government. 
Therefore, to regulate executive remuneration effectively, policymakers should make laws that 
will limit or eliminate the vehicles of human greed.  
Policy-makers have long demonstrated their reluctance in interfering in the internal affairs of 
the company to uphold the corporate form as a separate legal entity with rights and liabilities.2 
This reluctance by policymakers effectively means that executive pay is being determined by 
the board of management on which the executive sit. This opens up great potentials for conflict 
of interest and also providing a vehicle for human greed which could manifest in the process 
of determining executive remuneration and consequently reflect on the executive pay levels. 
                                                          
1 Posner R. Economic Analysis of Law (NY, 2011, 4 thedn.) chapters 1 & 2. 
2 Salomon v Salomon [1896] UKHL 1. 
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This article will argue that executive remuneration cannot be effectively regulated so long as 
the executives still occupy the position that they have in the company and the management of 
the company still solely in the hands of the board of management. This article will proceed to 
identify and discuss the presence and manifestation of greed in the executive pay determination 
process and the pay levels. This paper will first, examine the origin of the executive 
remuneration problem and discuss the role played by human greed. Secondly, the paper will 
also examine the ineffectiveness of the current regulatory mechanisms that brings out the 
presence/role of human greed.  Third, the paper will discuss some evidences of greed as they 
are being perceived by the public, shareholders, academics and stakeholders. The paper will 
conclude by discussing the way forward on whether executive remuneration driven by greed  
can be regulated. 
Greed: The genesis of excessive executive’s remuneration 
Executive’s remuneration became a contentious issue of corporate governance in the UK after 
the privatisation of some utility companies in the UK in the early 1990. The privatisation 
process was a market liberalisation procedure to encourage the economy of the UK to recover 
after World War II. Through the liberalisation of the market, the government also wanted to 
encourage private entities to participate in the economic development of the country. 
Consequently, the government removed its regulations and restrictions on businesses leaving 
its governance in the hands of the management of the companies. The liberalisation of the 
market, created great potentials for conflict of interest because the executives could determine 
their own pay. This opportunity was quickly taken over by human greed and its manifestation 
was almost immediately evident in the pay package of the then British Gas chief executive 
director. In the words of Engmann, greed can be described as one of the deadly sins of a man 
and it can be manifest in different ways such as greed for life, money, power, knowledge, etc.3 
The executives used the power and the position bestowed upon them by the company to acquire 
more for their own benefits and also to acquired more money for themselves. The privatisation 
of British Gas in the early 1990s saw the pay of the then executive director, Mr. Cedric Brown’s 
pay soar over 300% of his pay before privatisation. This pay increase could not be justified on 
company performance, but the more realistic justification for Mr Browns’ behaviour would be 
human greed. Considering that the state had (and still are) reluctant to interfere in the internal 
                                                          
3 Michael Engmann, Greed is Good Big is Bad (Xlibris Corporation, 2014) 13. 
affairs of the businesses, greed pushed Mr Brown not just to award himself enough, but much 
more than what would have been expected from a reasonable man. Even though, Mr Brown’s 
pay was highly criticised, and Mr Brown called to justify his pay in the house of parliament, it 
did not stop the wave of freedom that human greediness had found. Since then, the growth in 
executive pay has continued to increase and it has been criticised by media4, academics5, 
shareholders6, government7, etc., but yet, the pay growth has not stalled or decreased. Greed 
could make the executives to focus more on their interest rather than the interest of the 
company, shareholders, stakeholders and/or the society as a whole. A survey carried out by the 
Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA)8 showed that there is a growing 
anecdotal evidence that executives do not understand their exotic packages. This is a clear 
evidence of greed because greed does not allow the person to be objective and analytical. 
Earlier academic researchers had identified the presence of this human greed, but addressed it 
in other terms such as the agency theory’ or ‘the agency problem’.9The agency problem in this 
context is the conflicts of interest that exist in the relationship between the executives and the 
company. The executives are expected to act in ways that will promote the success of the 
company, but because of their potential conflicts of interest that has served as a vehicle for 
human greed, the executive have been found to act more in their best interest.10 Executive 
remuneration has been researched and many discussions has been centered on this agency 
problem11, rather than addressing the underlying problem of the agency problem which is 
human greed. 
The effect of Greed on the regulation of executive remuneration 
                                                          
4 ‘Fat Cats in the Dock’ (1995) Economist March 4th. 
5Bolton P, Mehran H and Shapiro J, ‘Executive Compensation and Risk Taking’ (2015) 19(6) Rev Financ 2139-
2181. 
6Macalister T, Treanor J and Farrell S, ‘BP Shareholders revolt against CEO’s £14m Pay Package’ (2016) The 
Guardian, April 14th. 
7 Case Study: The Case of British Gas (1996) 4(1) Corp. Gov. Inter. Rev. 21, 22; Swinford S., ‘Theresa May 
unveils crackdown on executive pay and announces new plans to protect pensions’ (2016) The Telegraph, 
November 29th. 
8 Company Lawyer, ‘Executive Remuneration needs a Rethink according to ICSA Survey’ (2016) 37(9) Comp. 
Law. 282-283 
9Bebchuk L and Fried J, ‘Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem’ (2003) 17(3) The Journal of 
Economic Perspective 71-92; Conyon M, ‘Executive Compensation and Incentives’ (2006) 20(1) The Academy 
of Management Perspective 25-44; Townsend R. and Shue K., ‘Growth through rigidity: An explanation for the 
Rise in CEO pay’ (2017) 123(1) Journal of Financial Economics 1-21. 
10 Bebchuk L and Fried J, ‘ Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem’ (2003) 17(3) The Journal of 
Economic Perspective 71-92. 
11 Bertrand M and Mullainathan S, ‘Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are’ (2001) 
116(3) Quarterly Journal of Economics 901-932. 
Pay disclosure 
In the early 1990s, there is a very little required by the companies in terms of disclosure. There 
was very little transparency and accountabilities in how the executive remuneration was being 
determined. This lack of transparency and accountability presented itself as the perfect vehicle 
for greed to ride on. Executives were able to enrich themselves as much as they could because 
they were not obliged to explain themselves to the shareholders/public/media for what they 
were doing. Although they had the shareholders to answer to in the annual general meeting, 
the shareholders had no resources to base their arguments on. The result of this was the 
continuous rise in the levels of remuneration, complexity of the pay package and pay gap 
between the executives and the workers.12 In 2002, companies were required to produce a 
Directors’ Remuneration Report which contained information on the process of determining 
executive remuneration.13 This report was subject to shareholder advisory vote at the annual 
general meeting.14 Academics at the time,15 argued that the disclosure requirement and the 
shareholder vote on the remuneration report were not adequate to curb excessive executive 
remuneration. Even though some academic research demonstrated some improvement in pay-
performance sensitivity as a result of the disclosure rules16, the financial crisis of 2008 revived 
the debate over excessive executive remuneration. In 2013, more enhanced disclosure rules 
were enacted by the government on executive remuneration.17 Research has demonstrated that 
the disclosure requirements  is yet to improved the link between executive pay and the company 
performance or has it closed up the gap between executive pay and rank profile employee 
pay.18Gupta et al.19 argued in their research that companies were using the disclosure 
                                                          
12 Murphy K, ‘Executive Compensation: Where we are, and How we Got There’ (2012) Marshall School of 
Business Working Paper (FBE 7.12) available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2041679 
accessed on the 4th of May 2017. 
13 The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulation 2002 (SI 2002 1986) which inserted the new s243B into the 
then Companies Act 1985. 
14 S241A of the then Companies Act 1985 
15 Roach L, ‘The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulation 2002 and the disclosure of executive 
remuneration’ (2004) 25(5) Comp. Law. 141-148. 
16FerriF and Maber D, ‘Say on pay votes and CEO compensation: evidence from the UK’ (2013) 17(2) Review 
of Finance 527-563. 
17 Schedule 8 of the Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) (Amendments) 
Regulations 2013. 
18 Gupta A, Chu J and Ge X, ‘Form Over Substance? An Investigation of Recent Remuneration Disclosure 
Changes in the UK’ (2016) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2798001 accessed 4th May 
2017; Gordon S, ‘UK disclosure rules tying CEO pay and performance not working’ (2016) Financial Times, 
June 27th. 
19 Gupta A, Chu J and Ge X, ‘Form Over Substance? An investigation of Recent Remuneration Disclosure 
Changes in the UK’ (2016) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2798001 accessed 4th May 
2017 
requirement only to manage their reputation, and many companies reported only on certain 
geographical locations or certain types of workers. These research findings demonstrates the 
fact that the executives have great potentials and power to act in the ways that will benefit 
them, and these potentials are being greatly exploited by human greed resulting in the 
ineffectiveness of the aims of the disclosure requirement. 
Executive directors’ disclosure requirement has been considered a contributory factor to the 
increasing levels of executive pay levels.20 This disclosure enhances the access to market 
comparator information on executive remuneration in which the executive and the board can 
use to strengthen executive’s bargaining power.21 This availability of information on pay levels 
increases the expectation and negotiation stance for the executives, and this as well give greed 
another vehicle to ride on. Executive pay disclosure rules have not only failed to achieved the 
intended aims of curbing excessive remuneration but it also has unintended consequences of 
pushing executive pay levels up by giving human greed more opportunities to manifest.22 
Through the disclosure of executive remuneration, the shareholders, the public, the media and 
stakeholders etc., have realised the excessive executive remuneration  except the executives 
themselves. This can only have  one justification which is human greed. Ms Theresa May (the 
Britain's Prime Minister) proposed plans to compel companies to disclose the ratio of the 
CEO’s pay to that of the average employee.23 Given the ineffectiveness of the disclosure of 
executive remuneration package, it is difficult to see how the disclosure of the pay ratio 
differences would have had an impact on executive pay levels. After she Realising that these 
plan may not be the best move to curb executive excessive pay, the proposals were 
abandoned.24 
Shareholder Say on pay 
The Companies Act 2006 has given the shareholders the power through voting to monitor and 
hopefully curb excessive executives’ remuneration. The advocates of shareholder pay on pay 
                                                          
20 Edward Iacobucci, "The Effects of Disclosure on Executive Compensation" (1998) 48(4) U. Tor. L.J. 489, 
503. 
21Iacobucci, ‘The Effects of Disclosure on Executive Compensation’ (1998) 48(4) U. Tor. L.J. 489.  
22Schoenberger C, ‘How More Pay Disclosure has Pushed up Executive Compensation’ (2016) available 
http://review.chicagobooth.edu/accounting/2016/article/how-more-pay-disclosure-has-pushed-executive-
compensation accessed on the 4th of May 2017. 
23 O’Connor S, Oakley D and Parker G, ‘Theresa May’s plan to expose boss-employee pay gap flawed’ (2016) 
Financial Times, September 22nd. 
24 Pickard J and Gordon S, ‘May waters down plans for binding votes on executive pay’ (2016) Financial Times 
November 29th. 
advanced, the fact that say on pay will enhances accountability and transparency in the 
determination process of executive remuneration through shareholder voting.25However, this 
has not made any significant difference to the rate of growth of executives’ remuneration. 
Shareholder say on pay was advocated since 2002, but there has not been any significant change 
in executives’ remuneration levels as a result of shareholder activism. Shareholders have 
demonstrated the unwillingness to use the powers vested upon them by abstaining from 
resolutions on directors’ remuneration in the annual general meeting.26 One of the reasons is 
the challenges faced with the nature of the disclosure and the information disclosed. The 
shareholders are unable to understand the information or don’t pay attention to the details 
provided and consequently are unable to fully make an informed decision on executives’ 
remuneration.27 Main and Johnson28 stated that ‘The complexities of present-day remuneration 
packages demand a degree of expert knowledge and specialised information. If pay is to be 
linked to performance, then it seems wise to give some attention to this details, and it also seem 
wise that the dominant perspective on such matters comes from those who most obviously 
represent the shareholders, i.e. the board and the non-executive in particular.’ Main and 
Johnson, therefore, recognised that the shareholders may not be in the best position to monitor 
and curb excessive executive’s remuneration and therefore, there is a need for the experts (who 
are the remuneration committee) and the board to act on behalf of the shareholders. Considering 
that the remuneration committee and remuneration consultants are not completely independent 
from the board of executives, they are therefore incapable of safeguarding the interest of the 
shareholders.29 Shareholders’ ability to effectively monitor and curb excessive executive 
remuneration may be effected by the fear that large dissent vote could diminish the market 
value of the company.30 This, therefore, mean that shareholders may not use their power to 
                                                          
25 Gregory I, Thompson S and Wright P, ‘CEO Pay and Voting Dissent Before and After the Crisis’ (2014) 
124(574) The Economic Journal F22-F39 
26Gregory-Smith I and Main BGM, ‘Binding Votes on Executive Remuneration’ (2013) available online 
http://webmeets.com/files/papers/res/2014/745/v2013_10_03.pdf accessed on the 9th of May 2017. 
27Gerner-Beuerle C. and Kirchmaier T., ‘Say on Pay: Do Shareholders Care?’ (2016) FMG Discussion Paper 
DP751, Available https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2720481 accessed on the 4th of May 
2017. 
28 BGM Main and Johnson J, ‘Remuneration Committee and Corporate Governance’ (1993) 23(1) A & BR 351, 
352 
29Conyon M& Peck S ‘Board Control, Remuneration Committees, and Top Management Compensation’ (1998) 
41(2) Academy of Management Journal 146-157; Conyon M, Peck S, Read L, & Sadler G, ‘Compensation 
Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom’ (2009) 23 Academy 
of Management Perspectives 43–55; Conyon M, Peck S, Read L, & Sadler G, ‘New Perspectives on the 
Governance of Executive Compensation: Examining the Role and Effect of Compensation Consultants’ (2011) 
15 Journal of Management and Governance 29–58. 
30 Gregory-Smith I and Main BGM, ‘Binding Votes on Executive Remuneration’ (2013) available online 
http://webmeets.com/files/papers/res/2014/745/v2013_10_03.pdf accessed on the 9th of May 2017. 
vote against the remuneration report or simply abstain from voting, consequently having no 
effect on executive remuneration levels. However, say on pay has given shareholders the 
opportunity to voice their dissatisfaction which can be observed through the substantial 
increase in levels of dissent votes even though, very weak moderation of executive 
remuneration can be evidenced.31 
The research conducted in this area has been very scanty, but the common theme arising from 
the different findings is the fact that shareholder say on pay has not curbed excessive executive 
remuneration.32 Shareholder say on pay is one of the mechanisms used with the hope of 
reducing greed and providing more transparency and accountability in the process of 
determining executive director’s remuneration. It was hoped that formalised say on pay will 
help the management board to look beyond greed and negotiate a more efficient compensation 
contract with the executive directors’ on behalf of the shareholders. Others33 argued that 
directors’ may ill-inform the shareholders, which is a demonstration and evidence of greed. 
However, some impact has been documented by researchers with firms responding to high 
dissent vote by removing the controversial issues identified.34 Shareholder dissent on say-on-
pay is higher in firms where CEO compensation is high or 'excessive', and in firms with poor 
performance.35 Although some researchers36have demonstrated that there was little evidence 
that CEO pay is lower in firms that previously experienced high levels of shareholder dissent, 
but this did not make any significant impact on curbing excessive executive remuneration. It 
can be argued that the reason why shareholder say on pay has not been effective in curbing 
executive excessive pay is simply because of greed. This is because the information primarily 
required by the shareholder to make an informed decision is prepared by the directors. This 
give the executives the potentials to disclose the information in the way that will benefit them, 
and it’s a question of whether the information disclose by the executives is adequate for the 
shareholders to make an informed judgement or not. Furthermore,  the key determining factor 
                                                          
31Gregory-Smith I, Thompson S and Wright P, ‘Say on Pay Before and after the Crisis: UK Utility Companies’ 
(2014) 16(3) Network Industries Quarterly 16-18. 
32 Ndzi E, ‘UK Shareholder Voting on Directors’ remuneration: Has Binding Vote made any Difference?’ 
(2017) 38(5) Comp. Law. 139-149. 
33Such as Bainbridge S, ‘Remarks on Say on Pay: An Unjustified Incursion on Director Authority’ (2008) 
UCLA School of Law, Research Paper No. 08-06. 
34Ferri F and Maber D, ‘Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK’ (2013) 17 Review 
of Finance 527-563. 
35 Conyon M, ‘Shareholder Dissent on Say-on-pay and CEO compensation’ (2016) available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2748645 accessed on the 4th of May 2017. 
36Conyon M and Sadler G, ‘Shareholder voting and Directors’ Remuneration Report Legislation: Say on Pay in 
the UK’ (2010) 18(4) Corporate Governance: An International Review 296-312; Ferri F and Maber D, ‘Say on 
Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK’ (2013) 17(2) Rev Financ 527-563. 
for the shareholders may be the share price in the market and the dividends that they receive. 
This point is supported by the study done by Conyon37 who found out that the firms that had 
superior market performance (shareholder return) were less likely to receive shareholder 
dissent vote. Executive remuneration has been an issue since the early 1990s and the 
shareholders are aware of the complexity of the pay package and the payment process, research 
has demonstrated that the shareholders might not be that interested in the determination of 
executive remuneration. Gerner-Beuerle and Kirchmaier38 argued that shareholder do not pay 
attention to the details provided on executive remuneration, they only based their judgment on 
how to vote on the top-line remuneration figure provided on the single figure remuneration 
report. 
It is obvious that where there are high executive remuneration with no clear explanation or 
large increases in executive remuneration, shareholder dissent votes will be higher. Therefore, 
the  executives  in some cases tend to reduce pay in advance of shareholder voting.39 The 
shareholders then vote in favour of the remuneration report. This demonstrates the 
manipulation of the system by the executive to satisfy human greed. There has been some 
impact of say on pay, such as an increased discussion/conversation between the company and 
shareholders, but the levels of executive remuneration have not decreased.  
Corporate governance mechanisms 
The UK Corporate Governance Code recommended the use of remuneration committee to stop 
the executives from determining their own pay, thereby preventing the instances of conflict of 
interest on which greed ride.40 However, despite the importance of the function of the 
remuneration committee, several academic researchers have examined the impact of the quality 
of remuneration committee in determining the level and the structure of executive pay and their 
findings has suggested that the remuneration committee are not completely independent from 
the executive, meaning the executives still have a role to play in the determination of their 
                                                          
37 Conyon M, ‘Shareholder Say-on-pay Voting and CEO Comepnsation’ (2015) available online at 
http://www.cbs.dk/files/cbs.dk/call_to_action/shareholder_say-on-pay_voting_and_ceo_compensation.pdf 
accessed on the 8th of May 2017. 
38Gerner-Beuerle C and Kirchmaier T, ‘Shareholders’ Votes on CEO Pay Focus Mostly on Top-line Figures’ 
(2016) LSE Business Review, May 5th. 
39 Balsam S, Boone J, liu H and Yin J, ‘The Impact of Say-on-pay on Executive Compensation’ (2016) 35(2) 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 162-191. 
40 The UK Corporate Governance Code (The Financial Reporting Council, 2016) D.2.2. 
pay.41Executives have influence over the internal governance mechanisms which includes the 
determination of their compensation package.42It has been argued that the presence of the 
remuneration committee had no motivational effect on the executives to maximise the firm’s 
value but rather their presence increased managerial remuneration.43The remuneration 
committee has not been effective in curbing excessive executive remuneration but rather seen 
as acting in favour of the executives.44 This is because the remuneration committee is usually 
made up of executive directors of other companies who may be considered generally, to have 
the same goal as executives.45The members of the remuneration committee tend to be 
empathetic with the CEO because they are also CEOs of other companies and they network by 
interaction in executive meetings and by sitting on the boards of each other.46As a result of this 
criticism, The Prime Minister, Theresa May was proposing reforms to the composition of the 
remuneration committees to include employees’ representatives.47Although the proposal did 
not pushed through, it is difficult to see how this move would have made a difference given 
that the executives would still be able to have an influence on the remuneration committee.  
The biggest criticisms come from the use of remuneration consultants by the remuneration 
committee in the determination of executive pay and the impact of executive’s pay 
benchmarking on remuneration committee decision making on pay levels. The UK Corporate 
Governance Code recommended that the remuneration committee should be allowed to draw 
advice from outside if necessary.48 This outside advice are provided by remuneration 
                                                          
41 Such as O’Reilly C, Main B, & Crystal G, ‘CEO Compensation as Tournament and Social Comparison: A  
Tale of Two Theories’ (1988) 33 Administrative Science Quarterly 257-274; Singh H &Harianto F 
‘Management-Board Relationships, Takeover Risk and the Adoption of Golden Parachutes’ (1989b) Academy 
of Management Executive Journal, 32(7); Conyon M. & Peck S, ‘Board Control, Remuneration Committees, 
and Top ManagementCompensation’ (1998) 41(2) Academy of Management Journal 146-157. 
42Bebchuk L, Fried J and Walker D, ‘Managerial Power and rent extraction in the design of executive 
compensation’ (2002) 69 the University of Chicago Law Review 751-846; O’Reilly C, Main B, & Crystal G 
‘CEO Compensation as Tournament and Social Comparison: A Tale of Two Theories’ (1988) 33 Administrative 
Science Quarterly 257-274. 
43 Conyon M, ‘Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation’ (1997) 15(4) International Journal of 
Industrial Organisation 493-509; Main B and Johnston J, ‘Remuneration Committees and Corporate 
Governance’ (1993) 23 Accounting and Business Research 351-362. 
44 Main BGM, Richard Belfied and Katherine Turner, ‘Is there a Negotiation Process in UK Remuneration 
Committees?’ (2011) Research Paper Retrieved 21st  December 1, 13. 
45Conyon M & Peck S, ‘Board Control, Remuneration Committees, and Top Management Compensation’ 
(1998) 41(2) Academy of Management Journal 146-157; Bizjak J, Lemmon M, & Naveen L, ‘Does the Use of 
Peer Groups Contribute to Higher Pay and Less Efficient Compensation?’ (2008) 90 Journal of Financial 
Economics 152–168. 
46 Zhao Y and Renneboog L, ‘Us Knows Us in the UK: On Director Networks and CEO compensation’ (2011) 
17(4) Journal of Corporate Finance 1132-1157. 
47 Baker S, ‘Theresa May’s plan to put workers on board is borrowed from Germany and France’ (2016) The 
Independent, July 12th. 
48Financial Reporting Council, The UK Corporate Governance Code (2016) D2. 
consultants who are experts in market data to determine what remuneration levels would be 
appropriate for the executives based on the market.49 
Skovoroda and Bruce50 examines the changes to the composition of performance, peer groups 
used for performance evaluation in the setting to CEO on a year-on-year basis of FTSE 100 
companies realised that firms excluded relatively stronger performing peers from their peer 
group selection. The selection of peer groups and benchmarking of remuneration levels is done 
by the remuneration consultants in consultation with the remuneration committee. Research 
has established the fact that the remuneration consultants are not independent from the directors 
and their decision making tend to be influenced by the CEO given that most of them provide 
other services to the company and they would not want to lose those services.51The survey 
carried out by ICSA52 highlighted the fact that some of the blame for excessive pay must lie 
with remuneration consultants as benchmarking has pushed up pay rates.53 They recommended 
that the remuneration consultants need to think carefully about the impact of their decisions 
which might be difficult given that they are not independent from the directors. Firms are more 
likely to benchmark their executive remuneration against peers that pay their executives higher 
remuneration which in turn reflects their self-serving behaviour and greed.54 
Bender and Moir55 research studies realised that excessive executive remuneration is driven 
by human greed. However, they did not address the problem as such, rather they pointed out 
the fact that the best practice for executive remuneration which is the use for market 
benchmarks to determine salary and bonus levels, significant levels of performance-related 
pay, the desire for executives to hold equity in their companies, the disclosure of total 
shareholder return compared to an index, and a perceived need for conformity, in order to 
                                                          
49Ndzi E, ‘Remuneration Consultants’ Advice and its Effect on Pay’ (2015) 57(4) International Journal of Law 
and Management 340-350. 
50Skovoroda R and Bruce A, ‘Shifting the Gaolpost? Analysing Changes to Performance Peer Groups Used to 
Determine the Remuneration of FTESE 100 CEO’ (2017) 28 British Journal of Management 265 -279. 
51 Murphy K and Sandino T, ‘Executive Pay and ‘Independent’ Compensation Consultants’ (2010) 49(3) 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 247-262; Conyon M, Peck S and Sadler G, ‘Compensation Consultants 
and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom’ (2009) 23(1) Acad Manage. 
Perspect 43-55. 
52 Company Lawyer, ‘Executive Remuneration needs a Rethink according to ICSA Survey’ (2016) 37(9) Comp. 
Law. 282-283 
53 Company Lawyer, ‘Executive Remuneration needs a Rethink according to ICSA Survey’ (2016) 37(9) Comp. 
Law. 282-283 
54 Albuquerque A, Franco G and Verdi R, ‘Peer Choice in CEO compensation’ (2013) 108(1) Journal of 
Financial Economics 160-181. 
55 Bender R and Moir L, ‘Does ‘Best Practice’ in Setting Executive Pay in the UK Encourage ‘Good’ 
Behaviour?’ (2006) 67(1) Journal of Business Ethics 75-91 
grant legitimacy to policies; all possessed grey areas and provided opportunity for greed to 
manifest. Even though they pointed out that best practice might drive good executive 
behaviour (in other words, limit the greedy nature of executives), they pointed out that there 
were many reasons why the factors should not be used as best practised. All the reasons 
identified could all be rounded up to one, which is greed. Academics in other jurisdiction have 
also demonstrated that the presence of remuneration consultants pushes up remuneration levels 
where the consultants are paid for other services.56 
Bender57 pointed out that the remuneration consultants are important in the determination of 
executive remuneration because they act as experts that provides proprietary data against the 
companies which can benchmark executive remuneration. This consequently means that the 
remuneration committee has a direct influence on the choice of comparators and the executive 
remuneration as a whole.58 Their advice is meant to be used by the remuneration committee to 
legitimise their decisions. However, their lack of independence has given executive the 
opportunity to influence the consultant’s decision. Their lack of independence is also attributed 
to the fact that the market for executive remuneration consultants is concentrated (i.e. served 
by few consultants with large number of clients) and other services they offer to the company 
which opens up potentials for conflict of interest.59 The act of benchmarking executive 
remuneration tends to push up executive remuneration.60 Firms tend to select highly paid peers 
to enable them justify the pay package and levels they give to their executives. Furthermore, 
companies tend to engage in shopping for opinion between consultants to find favourable pay 
levels for their executives in which case they will always settle for the higher pay.61This 
practice is argued to be stronger in firms where the executives are members of other board 
(such as being the non-executive director of other board and maybe sitting on the remuneration 
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committee) and firms where the CEO has a longer tenure or where the CEO is the chairman of 
the board of directors.62Research has demonstrated that CEOs receive higher equity-based pay 
when firms employ more than one compensation consultant, and an increase in the number of 
compensation consultants is associated with an increase in CEO pay, whereas no decline in 
CEO pay takes place when firms reduce the number of pay consultants.63 
Evidence of greed on director’s remuneration 
Greed can be evidenced in director’s remuneration in a number of ways which include the pay 
for performance dichotomy, the pay gap between executives and rank profile employees and 
the ineffectiveness of regulatory mechanisms 
Pay for performance dichotomy 
Executive remuneration has been criticised due to the lack of link between directors’ 
remuneration and company performance. Several academic studies suggested that there is a 
very weak (in some instances, no) relationship between pay and company performance. This 
is a position which seemed to be driven by greed because without greed a ‘reasonable’ director 
would want to ensure that there is a strong correlation that exist between their pay and the 
company’s performance. There exists a wealth of academic studies in this area, however, with 
inconsistent findings as a result of different methods used by the academicians.64 The directors’ 
remuneration package is made up of different components which includes base salary, annual 
bonuses, long-term incentive plans (LTIP) and share options. The problem with the linking of 
executive pay to company performance is the lack of best practice in terms of what factors 
should be used to measure company performance.65In terms of measuring the performance of 
a company, academicians use a variety of performance factors which ranges from the return on 
asset, return on equity, total shareholder return, total revenue, earnings per share, market 
capitalisation, etc. Scholars use different remuneration components and different performance 
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measures and thereby obtaining different results, but the majority of the studies seem to suggest 
that directors’ remuneration has a weak/no relationship to company performance.66 
Geiler and Renneboog67 research on executive remuneration and payout decision demonstrate 
further the rule of greed in the director’s excessive remuneration package. Their research 
demonstrates  that corporate payout policies such as dividends, share repurchases, etc. are set 
by CEOs with the intent to maximize their personal wealth. They identified that the way to get 
rid of the greedy nature of the CEOs was to encourage firms/remuneration consultants to make 
top management's remuneration packages ‘dividend-neutral’, in other words, to remove the 
negative impact of the dividends on pay such that the payout and payout channel choice will 
not be influenced by the CEO's wealth. However, the question is how would this be possible?  
The pay gap between executives and rank profile employees 
The director’s remuneration has been criticised because of the pay gap that exist between the 
directors  and e ranked profile employees.68 This pay gap  have increased from 47% in 1998 to 
183% in 2015.69 Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association70 has noted the pay gap that exist 
between the directors  and e ranked profile employees and they have raises concern about the 
large pay gap  in reference to pension and lifetime savings and they are echoing the need for 
something to be done to close the large pay gap that exist between them. Even though,executive 
directors are the major decision makers of the company, the success of the company is 
dependent on a team effort between the directors and all the employees of the company.71 The 
idea that companies need to pay more to attract, retain and motivate executive directors’ and 
the market for talented executive has been challenged to be a myth.72 It has been estimated by 
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the High Pay Centre that chief executives earn on average £1,260 per hour73 as compared to 
the national minimum wage, which currently stands at £7.20 for adult whose age is above 25 
years. The Sun newspaper describes the pay gap as ‘obscene and undeserved’ when UK CEOs 
are pocketed on average £5.3m each year, which is 380 times more than a worker on national 
minimum wage.74 
Directors argue that it is their effective management that makes the company profitable, but 
the question is really whether the work of the director is as difficult and time-consuming as 
they claim and enough to justify the pay difference with an average employee.75 Although 
Bolchover76 simply argues that companies should focus more on nurturing talented people to 
become executive directors, this paper argues that executives are simply driven by greed to 
acquire more wealth. The reason put forward, which is to attract, retain and motivate directors 
and the market for executive talent, is just a vehicle to drive greed on. Without the force or 
interest to acquire more wealth and power (greed), directors will naturally without influence 
from the government, policy makers or the press, appreciate that the pay gap between them and 
rank profile employees needs to be narrow. The widening gap between executive pay and rank 
profile employee pay has attracted media, government and public interest since the 1990s, 
however, decades later, it is still an issue demonstrating the stronghold of greed in the subject 
matter. This greed costs the companies, the shareholders, the general public, taxpayers a lot of 
money as they constantly dedicate time and effort to monitor and debate on new strategies to 
resolve the problem. Given the stronghold of human greed on executive remuneration, it would 
have been difficult to see how the disclosure of executive pay ratio of employee pay ratio will 
curb excessive executive remuneration.77 What the policy maker wants to achieve through this 
disclosure requirement is pay ‘fairness’ between the executive and the employee. Furthermore, 
it is unclear what this fair pay may be from an executive point of view, shareholder point of 
view, public point of view, employee points of view, etc. Is the way forward bringing down 
executive pay or increasing employee’s pay?78 This is a time-consuming debate that not all 
involved may agree to one solution. However, this paper is arguing that this would not be a 
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necessary regulation if only human greed was not the key driving force for executive 
remuneration. 
Gupta et al.79 in their research found that mandatory disclosure on relative increase in Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and employee pay was subject to management discretion, as firms 
could self-select their employee comparator groups. Disclosure is the responsibility of the 
board of management, which include the CEO. The greedy nature of the CEO may push the 
management to disclose what will promote their self-interest. This can be justified by the fact 
that despite the enhanced disclosure requirement, the link between CEO pay and firm 
performance has not be strengthened nor has the pay gap between CEO and average employee 
decreased.80 Campaigns have been made by different pressure group on the gap between CEO 
pay and employee pay calling for the government to intervene and make strict regulation that 
will help to close the pay gap.81 Mr Corbyn discussing on the topic emphasised the fact that the 
pay gap is creating the worse levels of inequalities.82 This indicates that the depth at which 
greed has taken over executive remuneration has reach unexpected level. Medias and 
newspapers83 have spoken and written extensively on the huge pay gap, but yet not calling the 
name of the cause which is greed. 
The Trades Union Congress (TUC) went further to detail the extent to which the executive pay 
gap has gone within the Wire and Plastic Products (WPP) company in 2015. TUC analysis of 
Mr. Sorrell, the CEO of WPP, £70 million remuneration in 2015, represented more than 2,500 
times the average UK salary of £27,645. The pay was equivalent of £38,437 per hour and TUC 
estimated that Sorrell’s annual salary could have paid the wages for 2,218 nurses, 1,920 
paramedics, or 4,479 teaching assistants.84 Research has demonstrated that CEO-to-employee 
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pay gap has been increasing and continue to increase.85 This pay gap tend to demotivate the 
employees because they feel undervalued.86 However, this gap will not close up unless the law 
decides to interfere in the internal dealings of the company to make strict regulations or if 
executives stop being greedy. 
The executive talent market 
There is a growing internationalisation of executive talent (labour) market. Executives are able 
to use their skills in many other countries apart from their own country of origin. Executives 
tend to use this growing internationalisation of the executive talent market to demand for more 
earning if they realise that they can be paid more elsewhere. The US has been identified for 
paying its executives more than any other country. There are potential for talent movements 
between the UK and the US which will have a push-up effect of executive pay in the UK. 
However, it has been demonstrated that only 0.8%  of UK companies recruited executives from 
outside the UK.87 However, this may still have a knock-on effect on the pay levels of other 
executives in the UK when the companies engage on executive benchmarking exercise for the 
process of determining executive pay which may cause directors to move out of the companies 
when they realise that other companies are paying more.88 It has been argued that the design of 
executive remuneration package and the process involved is an opportunistic exploitation of 
managerial power89, simply put as greed. 
The myth about the limited talent pool of executives has also provided a great vehicle for 
executive greed to ride on. CEO talent has increasingly become more and more important in 
the determination of executive remuneration.90 Research has demonstrated that executive talent 
market has significant role in the determination of executive remuneration.91 Executives are of 
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the opinion that the talent pool is very limited and they tend to use this point to request for 
more pay. Research has demonstrated that firms that lose their executives to other firms tend 
to raise their pay levels to employ, motivate and retain their executives.92 
The way forward 
The big question is how can excessive executive remuneration be curbed? There is only one 
way to do so, by taking away the vehicles on which human greed ride which is any position 
that could put the executive in a potential conflict of interest. This could mean taking the 
position or powers away from the executive or it could mean the policy makers disregarding 
the separate legal entity principle and interfering in the internal management of the company. 
It is very difficult to achieve either of the propositions above. The executives’ power and 
position in the company is the basis of the potential conflict of interest, but this position is 
necessary for the executives to be able to make decisions in the company on a day-to-day basis. 
The executives are therefore running the company day-to-day basis on behalf of the company. 
This means that eliminating the basis of executives’ potentials for conflict of interest would 
not be possible.  
It is an established principle in company law that the company is a separate legal entity with 
rights and responsibilities. This means that the company is an artificial person and can take 
care of its own matters. This principle has formed the very basis of the company. Consequently, 
the policy-makers are not ready to disregard this principle and legislate on executive 
remuneration. It is considered that executive remuneration is the responsibility of the board of 
management and the shareholders. Given that none of the above proposition is possible, it can 
be concluded that executive remuneration cannot be effectively regulated unless the executives 
themselves decide to let human greed go and be reasonable in their pay deals. 
Conclusion 
Executive remuneration is a challenging problem because the directors are responsible for the 
decision making and the daily running of the company. This puts the executives at the centre 
of the company and also put the executives in a position with potential conflict of interest. This 
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conflict of interest provides fertile grounds for human greed to manifest if the executives are 
not careful. Without the manifestation of human greed in executive remuneration, there will be 
no need for regulation. But the presence of human greed is prompting the government to 
interfere (even though) in a very limited manner in the internal affairs of the company in terms 
of directors’ remuneration. However, this government interference through provisions in the 
Companies Act 2006 and recommendations in the UK Corporate Governance Code, has been 
unable to curb excessive executive remuneration. Research has clearly identified the fact that 
UK’s measures are ineffective to address the problem.93 If executive remuneration is to be 
effectively regulated, then policymakers must consider provisions that can eradicate the 
manifestation of human greed. This could mean disregarding the separate legal personality 
principle of the company which the policymakers don’t seem ready to do. It can, therefore, be 
concluded that executive remuneration cannot be effectively regulated because human greed 
has firmly established itself in the pay determination process and pay levels as a result of the 
executives’ position in the company and their potential conflict of interest. 
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